Opinion by Zbigniew Brzezinski reported in The Washington Post, 07/08/14
Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser from
1977 to 1981. This commentary was adapted from testimony he is scheduled to
deliver to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Wednesday.
More than three
months have passed since Vladimir Putin’s triumphalist speech to the
Russian parliament. In it, he exulted in his military seizure of Crimea while
basking in an orgy of chauvinistic sentiment. Putin clearly relished the
enthusiasm and apparently gave little thought to the larger, longer-term
strategic consequences of what he unleashed.
Three months later,
amid continuing uncertainty regarding the future of Russo-Ukrainian relations,
as well as growing international costs for Russia, Putin faces three basic
choices:
1. He could pursue
an accommodation with Ukraine by terminating the assault on its sovereignty and
economic well-being. This would require wisdom and persistence from Russia as
well as Ukraine and the West. Such an accommodation should involve the
termination of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine from within, ending any
threat of a larger invasion, and some sort of East-West understanding that
entails Russia’s tacit acceptance of Ukraine’s prolonged journey toward
eventual European Union membership. At the same time, it should be made clear
that Ukraine does not seek, and the West does not contemplate, Ukrainian
membership in NATO. It is reasonable for Russia to feel uncomfortable about
that prospect.
Additionally, it
would likewise be made clear that Russia no longer expects Ukraine to become
part of the “Eurasian Union,” which is a transparent cover
for the recreation of something approximating the former Soviet Union or
tsarist empire. This should not preclude, however, a Russian-Ukrainian trade
deal, since both countries can benefit from increasingly cooperative trade as
well as financial relations.
The international
community could reiterate its support for that outcome and the resumption of
more normal relations with Russia itself, including the lifting of sanctions.
2. Putin could
continue to sponsor a thinly veiled military intervention
designed to disrupt life in portions of Ukraine. Should Russia continue on this
course, obviously the West would have to undertake a prolonged and truly
punishing application of sanctions designed to convey to Russia the painful
consequences of its violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. This unfortunate
outcome would likely yield two basket cases in Eastern Europe: Ukraine, because
of destructive Russian actions, and Russia itself.
3. Putin could
invade Ukraine, exploiting Russia’s much larger military potential. Such
an action, however, would not only prompt retaliation by the West but also
could provoke Ukrainian resistance. If such resistance were sustained and
intense, there would be growing pressure on the members of NATO to support the Ukrainians in a
variety of forms, making the conflict much costlier to the aggressor.
For the Kremlin,
the consequence of this third option would be not only a permanently hostile
Ukrainian population of more than 40 million but also an economically and politically isolated Russia
facing the growing possibility of internal unrest.
The obviously
correct choice is to find a formula for accommodation, which must involve the
abandonment of the use of force against Ukraine by Russia. The issue of Crimea
will remain unresolved for now, but it will serve as an enduring reminder that
chauvinistic fanaticism is not the best point of departure for resolving
complex issues. This is why Putin’s actions are a threat not only to the West
but, ultimately, also to Russia itself.
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